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Abstract: This research investigates the different 
educational opportunities available to migrant children 
here defined as children whose hukou (household 
registration) is incompatible with their residing locality 
due to parental migration. I focus on Shanghai, the city 
with the largest migrant population in China. In the first 
section of this paper, I introduce the hukou system which 
maintains the regional exclusivity of public education 
among other forms of welfare and debars migrant children 
from having the same education opportunities as children 
with local-hukou. Then, I historicize major policy changes 
and effects, drawing from official statistics as well as 
international literature. The second section is comprised 
of my interviews with principals, administrators, and 
teachers from seven schools in Shanghai. Through the 
cross-comparison of numerous factors, this research 
finds a recurring trajectory from 2008-2018 among the 
interview migrant schools. Due to Shanghai’s city-wide 
demolition of unauthorized constructions and increasingly 
stringent migrant student admission requirements, migrant 
families are radically expelled from the city, resulting in a 
continuing decrease of student enrollment which threatens 
the survival of the remaining private migrant schools. 
Keywords: Hukou, Migrant Education, Education Policy, 
Migrant Schools, Public Education
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Introduction
 The hukou system, also known as the household registration 
system, was implemented in 1958 by the Communist Party of 
China as a social mechanism to monitor internal migration. It 
documents each citizen’s place of registration and stratifies the 
population into local residents and non-local migrants. “To some 
extent, [the hukou] is an internal ‘citizenship’ for Chinese people” 
(Chen and Feng, 2013, p.76). It institutionalizes on a national-
scale what Charles Tilly (1998) calls “categorical inequality” 
or the assigning of social memberships and unequal resource 
allocation (qtd. in Hao et al., 2014, p.515). Since individuals are 
only entitled to the public services and welfare programs within 
their hukou locality, migrants are excluded from basic forms of 
social security such as housing, healthcare, and education (Qian 
and Qian, 2017, p.239-240). Furthermore, hukou transferal is 
mandated by each province. Barriers to gaining a local hukou are 
set up in part to control population size and also to protect the 
rights of local hukou-holders who are increasingly anxious 
about the massive inflow of migrants and their consumption 
of limited resources. Thus, many migrants are caught between 
the economically-propelled mobility of their work and the 
relative immobility of their hukou, which remains tied to their 
hometown. During the past three decades, the gap between rural 
and urban development has widened, intensifying the social 
inequalities within the hukou system.
 According to the National Bureau of Statistics, “there 
were an estimated 288 million rural migrants in China in 2018, 
making up more than one-third of the entire working population” 
(“Migrant Workers and Their Children,” 2019). In particular, 
megacities like Beijing and Shanghai have experienced 
unsustainable population growth due to the ceaseless inpouring 
of migrants and corresponding policies to restrict migration. One 
of the major strategies employed is known as jiao yu kong ren or 
education as a form of population control. This essay investigates 
the processes and outcomes of the implementation of this strategy 
in Shanghai, the city with the largest migrant population in China. 
 By 2018, Shanghai was oversaturated with more than 
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9,726,800 permanent migrant residents, constituting 40% of its 
total population (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Because it 
is one of the four municipalities under the direct administration 
of the central government of China, all migrants in Shanghai 
are trans-provincial. Its neighbor, Anhui Province, is its number 
one migrant-exporting province, followed by Sichuan Province, 
Henan Province, Jiangxi Province, Suzhou Province, and Fujian 
Province. Geographically, migrants are concentrated in Shanghai’s 
suburban districts as well as the remote outskirts, particularly in 
Qingpu district. Migrants create additional stress on the funds 
and resources of these districts. For instance, in 2012, Shanghai’s 
average teacher-student ratio was 1:15.81, the highest being 
1:19.79 in the Songjing district (remote outskirt) and the lowest 
ratio being 1:10.59 in the Huangpu district (central district) (Wu, 
Wang, & Zhong, 2012, p.22).
 Many migrants migrate as a family unit, bringing their 
children along so that they will not become “left-behind children” 
(a status which is associated with psychological and behavioral 
problems as a result of abandonment) and may receive better 
education in the cities. Chen and Feng (2012) reported that there 
was one migrant child for every three children in Shanghai. The 
term “migrant children” is defined as children who migrated with 
their parents and whose place of hukou registration is incompatible 
with their residing province (city/county). The Chinese derogative 
term for them is “nong min gong zi di,” meaning the children of 
farmers and laborers. Though it is mainly colloquial, even the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China used this term until it was 
officially changed to a more respectful term, “sui qian zi nu,” 
meaning children who migrated along with their parents. 
 The assigned locality of one’s hukou is by law paternally 
inherited unless one is eligible to transfer it to another locality. 
Thus, even though many migrant children are born and raised 
in the cities, they keep their fathers’ hukou which restricts their 
access to public resources such as education — arguably the 
most crucial determinant of future income and profession. The 
public education system of China is bound up with the hukou 
system in a way that jeopardizes the rights of migrant children. 
Funding is distributed from each city-level education bureau 
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down to each district/county-level education bureau based on the 
number of students with local hukou in the region. As funds for 
public education are not portable across administrative units, the 
migration of school-age children is not matched by a national-
scale reallocation of funds. Without adequate funds allocated for 
migrant students, they become a financial burden to their host 
cities and districts. To prioritize students with local hukou, public 
schools in Shanghai made the hukou a mandatory criterion for 
admission. Migrant children applying to public schools need to 
provide a list of documents including: hukou, residence permits, 
birth certificates, parents’ IDs, immunization records, and social 
insurance. However, if one of the parents has the local hukou, the 
migrant child is eligible for public school enrollment. Seeing this 
opportunity, some migrant parents “fake divorce,” having one 
partner then “fake marry” a willing local hukou holder (Fu, 2018). 
Compensation for the local is usually negotiated beforehand. This 
example illustrates merely one way in which the hukou system 
has fragmented and traumatized migrant families in China. 
 In the 1990s, Shanghai strictly barred all migrant children 
from public schools. Even though public schools later opened up to 
migrant students, an extra fee called jiedufei (transient schooling 
fee) was charged. As a market response, hundreds of unlicensed 
private schools targeting migrant children sprang up. Without 
funds and regulation from education bureaus, some developed 
a profit-driven business model, charging tuition at a higher rate 
than public schools and compromising the quality of education 
by hiring unlicensed teachers. These schools rarely had complete 
year groups and were referred to as “slum schools” for their sub-
standard facilities. While public schools occupied official lands 
designated for education, migrant schools rented private lands 
and reconstructed existing structures into undersized campuses. 
Many of these migrant schools had to move frequently upon 
contract expiration or other issues. 
 Nevertheless, Shanghai is generally considered a lenient 
city in comparison to others. According to Cheng (2011), 
Shanghai established the notion that migrant children are also 
“our children … [and are] to be treated with reason and sympathy” 
(p. 96). District-level education bureaus paired migrant schools 
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with public schools for resource sharing, standardizing the 
faculty employment process, and designating a supervisor for 
each migrant school. In 2008, Shanghai launched a “three-year 
action plan for the education of migrant children” which was 
summarized in four Chinese characters: “guan” closedown, “bing” 
combine, “zhuan” privatize, and “ting” stop. Under this plan, 
the government closed down all migrant schools in the central 
districts and selectively “privatized” migrant primary schools in 
the peripheral districts. The term privatization is used to refer 
to the official incorporation of migrant schools into Shanghai’s 
system of private education. This reform period is also called “Na 
Min,” which directly translates to “incorporate” and “private,” 
respectively. The privatization of primary migrant schools was 
negotiated through service purchase contracts, which established 
a funding relationship between the government and the schools. 
This suggests that the government is now purchasing education 
for migrant students from these schools. The funding includes 
a 6,000 Chinese Yuan standard tuition subsidy per student as 
of 2018. Receiving the same amount of funds as local students, 
migrant students no longer needed to pay high tuition; only lunch 
fees were charged. The government also gave each school a one-
time subsidy of 500,000 Chinese Yuan for general repair. 
 While primary migrant schools joined the private 
schooling system, migrant middle schools were closed down and 
prohibited even in the peripheral districts. This left students who 
were not qualified for public middle schools to choose between 
transferring to schools in their “hometown” or terminating their 
education prematurely. Those who chose to stay in Shanghai 
often began working after middle school graduation or enrolled 
in vocational schools. For those who were able to complete pre-
tertiary education in Shanghai, the national college entrance 
exam (gaokao) became another barrier because it must be taken 
in one’s hukou locality. The gaokao is designed differently 
in each city/province in accordance with the local high school 
curriculum. Thus, migrant students who aim to score high on the 
gaokao should transfer back to a school in his or her “hometown” 
as early as possible (ideally before high school). Most students 
transfer when rising from primary to middle school. To limit 
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the admission of out-of-province students, universities typically 
assign an admission quota to each province. Peking University, 
National Tsing Hua University, Fudan University, Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University and other first-tier universities are concentrated 
in Beijing and Shanghai where the hukou students have 
statistically higher chances of being admitted than the non-hukou 
students who must compete in a larger pool for a fewer number 
of spots. Although Shanghai announced plans to open gaokao to 
non-hukou students in 2018, only a few qualify. Therefore, this 
plan is practically ineffective for the larger population. 
Interviews
 Between June and July 2018, I conducted a series of 
30-minute to 60-minute interviews with principals, administrators, 
and teachers of seven schools from four districts: three privatized 
and government-funded migrant schools, four public schools with 
a mix of local and migrant students, and Shanghai’s only public 
school that is completely comprised of migrant students, Jin Ding 
School. 
Shanghai Pu Dong Minban Lian Ying Primary School (Pu 
Dong New Area)
Interviewee: Principal Gao Jia Zhong
 Principal Gao informed me that Lian Ying Primary School 
was founded in 1997 for migrant students. At its height between 
2003 and 2005, this school had more than 1,800 students. In 
preparation for the 2010 World Expo, the government of Shanghai 
organized mass demolition and relocation of households within 
the construction area. Lian Ying Primary School was ordered to 
relocate to a smaller campus, which could only accommodate 
800 students. This privately rented structure does not satisfy 
Shanghai’s official standard for school campuses; its undersized 
playing field is an empty space between a ring of two-story houses 
in which the classrooms are located. The number of students at 
Lian Ying continues to drop at an alarming rate. By 2018, the 
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student number was a mere 300. Recruiting new students each 
year has become the school’s biggest challenge. This is partly 
due to requirements for migrant students to provide residence 
permits and social insurance, which disqualifies a large number 
of students. Another cause is Shanghai’s city-wide demolition 
of unauthorized construction, which forced migrants to either 
relocate into unauthorized, low-rent residential areas proximal to 
factories or to return to their “hometown.” The combined result 
is a radical reduction of students who can enroll at Lian Ying 
Primary School. Principal Gao says the school will be lucky to 
admit ten new students with legal student identity in fall 2019. 
 Lian Ying Primary School was privatized in 2009 under 
the oversight of Pu Dong New Area’s Education Bureau. Principal 
Gao compares himself to a consignor for the government, implying 
the loss of agency in school management after the conversion. 
The bureau provides yearly funding for student tuition, faculty 
salary, and campus maintenance, but Principal Gao claims that 
the funding has been decreasing over the past few years. He also 
claims that teachers are being paid less than 3,000 Chinese Yuan 
per month, barely higher than the minimum wage of Shanghai. 
 In addition to decreasing funding, the bureau also ceased to 
provide teacher training programs for Lian Ying Primary School. 
Principal Gao claims that the school originally partnered with a 
neighboring public school called Sanlin Central Primary School 
for resource sharing and open class events, but no exchange or 
activity occurred between 2016 and 2018. “The gap between 
them and us is quite embarrassing,” he said. The teacher turnover 
rate at Lian Ying is relatively high; younger, female English 
teachers tend to leave for better opportunities. Financially tied, 
the school did not recruit new teachers to make up for the absent 
positions; instead, elder Chinese teachers were asked to cover for 
both subjects. 
 The only “school nurse” at Lian Ying sat in a small dingy 
room designated for the infirmary and watched soap dramas. She 
had neither a registered nurse license nor professional experience 
in medical care, and she was there merely to cover the position 
and provide basic care such as bandaging. When asked whether 
the school accommodated any students with special needs or 
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disabilities, she said that although there was one student with 
Down Syndrome, no special care or program was provided to 
him. The student studied among his peers despite not being able 
to grasp the materials and was seen eating trash on the playing 
field during class time. 
 According to Principal Gao, Sanlin Town originally had 
seven migrant primary schools, but five schools were closed by 
the local education bureau. In 2018, Lian Ying Primary School 
was one of the two remaining schools. Principal Gao estimates 
that the number of migrant schools in the entire Pu Dong New 
Area has dropped from 41 to 29.
Shanghai Pu Dong Wan Liao Private Primary School (Pu 
Dong New Area)
Interviewee: Principal Wang Zhi Yu
 Principal Wang founded Wan Liao Primary School in 
1999. She says it was originally named Si Zao Primary School 
and sat on the rented legacy of a community school. When Wan 
Liao was privatized in 2008, it received new desks and chairs 
from the local education bureau. Principal Wang notes that these 
utilities have not been replaced by the education bureau in the 
past ten years; she recently purchased new desks and chairs and 
installed multimedia facilities in the classrooms, paying out of 
her own pocket. At the time of the interview, 532 students were 
enrolled; their hukou represented 13 provinces across China, 
the northernmost being Jilin Province and the southernmost 
being Yunnan Province. Upon graduation, about one-third of the 
students transferred back to their “hometown.” Principal Wang 
states that common jobs of the parents include catering, service, 
and construction — about a third work for Shanghai’s express 
delivery companies. When parents work night shifts, students do 
homework in their teachers’ offices or homes as they wait for 
their parents to pick them up. Teachers at Wan Liao are constantly 
overworked. On average, each one of them teaches up to 20 
blocks per week, far higher than public school standards. Of the 
28 teachers, only 12 had received a bachelor’s degree. 
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Shanghai Yu Miao Primary School (Minhang District)
Interviewee: Vice Principal Yao Tao
 Yu Miao Primary School was founded in 1996 and 
privatized in 2009. It also received abundant government subsidies 
to renew its campus and set up multimedia facilities during the 
first few years after conversion. By 2018, its remaining subsidies 
were running out. Vice Principal Yao says that he planned to 
consolidate the school’s buildings to protect against earthquakes 
with magnitudes up to levels of seven and eight. However, 
the Minhang Education Bureau rejected his funding request. 
Principal Yao was left to pay for the consolidation project at his 
own expense, though he could not afford the originally planned 
security level and had to postpone the project. Vice Principal Yao 
echoes the human resources director at Jin Ding School, saying 
that the bureau is extremely strict when it comes to checking the 
financial reports of private schools like his. 
 Yu Miao’s total student population remained steady at 
around 1,500 in its first 15 years. However, during 2016-2018, 
the number of students almost halved due to the demolition of 
unauthorized constructions and the strict admission policy. 
Around 900 students were studying at Yu Miao in June 2018. 
The number of first grade classes had been reduced from five to 
three. “Our future is uncertain,” Vice Principal Yao confessed. 
According to the student family background survey provided by 
him, the students at Yu Miao came from a total of 26 provinces 
in China. Expectedly, Anhui Province is the number one migrant-
exporting province, followed by Sichuan Province. A second-
grade parent sampling shows that 25% of the parents had primary 
diplomas, 54% had high school diplomas, 11% had attained 
bachelor’s degrees, and 6% were illiterate. Despite the majority of 
them not having attended higher education, their expectations of 
their children’s education were high: in a multiple-choice survey, 
32% expected their children to obtain a doctorate degree, 15% 
selected a master’s degree, and 28% selected a bachelor’s degree. 
In addition, of the 45 teachers at Yu Miao, 60% had bachelor’s 
degrees, and only 30% had junior college or vocational school 
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diplomas.
 Vice Principal Yao says Yu Miao is supported by non-
profit organizations including the Shanghai Charity Foundation, 
Save the Children, and Shanghai Roots & Shoots, which provides 
lessons on dental health. It also has teacher training programs 
with East China Normal University and benefits from firms such 
as NBA China that practice corporate social responsibility (CSR).
 
Shanghai Qibao No. 3 Middle School (Minhang District)
Interviewee: Principal Cheng Qing
 In 2011, Principal Cheng was commissioned by the Qibao 
Education Bureau to prepare for the establishment of Qibao No. 
3 Middle School. By 2018, the school ranked number three in the 
entire Minhang District for its students’ outstanding performance 
on zhongkao, or the entrance exam for senior high schools. 
Migrant students account for 15% of all students at Qibao No. 3 
Middle School. Unlike the aforementioned public schools, it is not 
obligated to accept government-assigned students in the Shanghai 
online admission system. It only accepts non-hukou students if 
they can provide a property ownership certificate which proves 
that their parents own a house in Shanghai. Principal Chang asks, 
“How do we distinguish between blue-collar migrant laborers and 
successful migrants?” He answers his own question by saying, 
“Well, those with property in Shanghai are the ones who made 
it.” He claims that even with this requirement, accommodating 
eligible students is already enough pressure for the school. Qibao 
No. 3 Middle School’s students are from high-income residential 
areas; Principal Cheng particularly mentions a top-ranking 
“market village” called Jiuxingcun where a substantial amount of 
hukou students live.
 Principal Cheng helped coordinate the privatization 
reforms of migrant schools during 2008-2009 on behalf of the 
Minhang Education Bureau. He claims that many parents reacted 
negatively to the closing down of their children’s schools at the 
time. To that, he responds, “If you still think your child’s old 
school is better after a month, I will transfer your child back.” 
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Principal Cheng claims that the school proactively tries to convince 
migrant students from seventh grade onwards to transfer back to 
their “hometown” and prepare for the local gaokao. When asked 
to compare hukou and non-hukou students, he says that migrant 
students generally lack preschool education and private tutoring. 
Their knowledge tends to be limited to textbook knowledge, 
while local students are more well-rounded and informed. This 
may be explained by the differences in family education as local 
parents tend to devote more time to interacting with their children 
than migrant parents, some of whom are preoccupied with work. 
 Finally, Principal Cheng argues that although manipulating 
education as a mechanism for population control can cut official 
expenditures and free-up public resources, the government 
of Shanghai, waving the flag of standardization, showed no 
responsibility for the migrant children of this city. It only wants 
to accommodate the elites, though the migrants (mainly lower-
middle class laborers) are considered indispensable and their 
eviction is also consequential to the economy of the city.
Jing’an District, Shanghai Ling Nan Middle School
Interviewee: Admissions Director Cao Ding Qi
 Ling Nan Middle School is a public school founded in 
1990. Director Cao says she has worked here since 1994. This 
school has a steady source of migrant students from a nearby 
residential area called Pengpuxincun. Ke Ji Primary School and 
Yang Qu Primary School are its two main sources of students. 
Of the 381 students enrolled at the time of my interview, 125 
were non-hukou students. Upon entering middle school, all 
students are either placed into homerooms called “key classes” or 
“parallel classes” based on their entrance exam scores. Those who 
scored higher in core subjects are placed in “key classes,” while 
those with mid to lower range scores are placed in the “parallel 
classes.” This homeroom arrangement is also linked with teacher 
proficiency, as experienced teachers are usually allocated to “key 
classes” to ensure that those students will succeed on the gaokao. 
Migrant students make up roughly 15% in the “key classes” and 
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50% in the “parallel classes.” Each year, 20 to 30 of them transfer 
back to their hukou locality after finishing sixth grade. 
 Among the seven schools discussed in this research 
paper, Ling Nan Middle School is the only school in central 
Shanghai. It belongs to what was formally named the Zhabei 
District, economically the weakest district in central Shanghai. 
In 2015, Zhabei District was combined with Jing’an District, 
the commercial center of Shanghai. Director Cao says that the 
Zhabei District benefits from sharing funds with Jing’an District. 
She says this move allows them to share funds and resources for 
public education with the Jing’an District’s Education Bureau. 
However, the local education bureau did not provide subsidies for 
migrant students in this school like it did for migrant students in 
private schools.
Shanghai Hua Lin Middle School (Pu Dong New Area)
Interviewee: Party Branch Secretary Wang Ying
 Hua Lin Middle School was founded in 1995 as a public 
junior high school. It has 400 students, 70% of whom are non-
hukou students. Located on the urban-rural fringe of Shanghai, 
Hua Lin Middle School also faces the challenge of student 
recruitment. Each year, students rising from migrant primary 
schools are assigned to nearby public schools by the local bureau 
based on their temporary resident permit. Secretary Wang said 
that even though a substantial number of students are within the 
assigning area of Hua Lin Middle School, the average number that 
actually enrolls each year is a class of 40. When circumstances 
allow, most parents try to send their children to better schools 
outside of the area. Often that means “getting in through the back 
door.” Thus, a considerable portion of Hua Lin Middle School’s 
student source is pulled out of its original assignment. Its high 
percentage of migrant hukou students may be one of the factors 
that cause local parents to avoid sending their children here, 
as migrant schools are stereotypically perceived to have lower 
educational quality and low socioeconomic compositions. At Hua 
Lin Middle School, local hukou students and non-hukou students 
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are separated by class. Migrant students can be placed into a local 
class when they accumulate 120 points and qualify for a local 
hukou. Of the 100 to 200 students recruited for sixth grade, a 
third would transfer back to their “hometown” by the end of the 
year. Ms. Wang said, “There is little point in transferring after 
they rise to seventh grade.” 
Shanghai Jin Ding School (Putuo District)
Interviewee: Vice Principal Zhou Jian Kui
 In August 2009, the “three-year action plan” took effect 
in Putuo District where all migrant primary schools were ordered 
to close down. Impacted students were temporarily absorbed into 
public schools nearby. According to Vice Principal Zhou, some 
migrant schools only served cabbage and rice to students “whose 
bodies are still growing.” Students’ health was being jeopardized 
by the lack of regulation for these schools. During the Na Min 
period, several migrant school owners felt their interests were 
being violated and created “chaos” in the district. Cao Yang 
Primary School and Zeng Guang Middle School were entrusted 
with the task of managing relocated students. The Shanghai 
Jin Ding School was founded in 2009 as a public, government-
sponsored, nine-year school to properly accommodate migrant 
students in Min Hang district. It remains the only public school 
with 100% non-hukou migrant students in Shanghai. At its early 
stage, Jin Ding “borrowed” faculty from other public schools, 
many of whom preceived working there as a charitable act. Moral 
education directors struggled to manage the migrant students, 
whose problematic behaviors included fighting and stealing the 
school’s water meters and metal staircase bars, then selling these 
items for money. 
 Vice Principal Zhou shared anecdotes of his visits to 
migrant students’ homes: in those early years, students had crude 
studying conditions. Some students lived in basements, some lived 
under a bridge, and some even lived in metal huts by a railway. A 
family of eight shared a single room. Many students had no desk 
to do their homework on and had to write on their bed. When Vice 
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Principal Zhou hosted the first parent-teacher conference in 2009, 
parents came to school riding tricycles (loaded with recycled old 
refrigerators), small trucks, or motorcycles. They wore slippers 
and undershirts, chewing sunflower seeds or smoking as they 
stood on the field. Vice Principal Zhou recalls that one parent said 
to him, “I have never attended a parent-teacher conference before 
in my life.” For many migrant parents and students, Jin Ding 
was their first formal school. Vice Principal Zhou says, by 2018, 
most students live in decent apartments with their own rooms and 
decorated desks while parents typically commute using scooters 
or private cars. At parent-teacher conferences, they dress in clean 
and respectable clothing. 
 The Min Hang Education Bureau forbade Jin Ding from 
recruiting new students in 2009, deeming its purpose as serving 
only the provision of compulsory education for then current 
students. New migrant students who were eligible for public 
school enrollment had to apply to other schools. However, facing 
the overwhelming number of school-age migrant children in Min 
Hang district, Jin Ding cautiously recruited one class of first-grade 
students in 2010. By 2017, the school was recruiting 12 classes 
per year and expanded to three campuses, located throughout the 
Putuo District. Eligible students are assigned to Jin Ding annually 
through Shanghai’s online admission system. Unlike normal 
public schools, Jin Ding does not accept migrant students who 
accumulated 120 points and, therefore, qualified for local hukou. 
Students who reached 120 points after enrolling at Jin Ding may 
transfer to a regular public school and take the college entrance 
exam with students holding a local hukou. Other students often 
either transfer back to their “hometowns” or choose alternative 
programs such as vocational schools. 
 Jin Ding faces the problem of student performance 
polarization, as students with access to preschool education 
and extra tutoring significantly outpreform those without. The 
polarization patterns are especially evident in math and English 
classes. An English teacher at Jin Ding said that migrant students 
speak English with strong dialect accents and are not confident 
enough to speak in class even when encouraged. Family education 
is another major factor in student performance at school. Most 
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parents’ highest degree is a middle or high school diploma. 
However, Vice Principal Zhou stresses that the school will not 
lower educational standards because these students are migrants; 
it will exhaust all possible resources to support their development. 
To better accommodate the special needs of migrant students, Jin 
Ding designed a special curriculum that is divided into five lesson 
areas: technical, handiwork, creative, behavioral, and moral. 
 As the only 100% migrant student public school in 
Shanghai, Jin Ding has received considerable attention from the 
government as well as non-government organizations. Social 
support often came in two forms: supplies or human resources. 
According to Vice Principal Zhou, charity groups including 
Stepping Stones, Save the Children, and Shanghai Roots & Shoots 
have consistently organized educational and health programs for 
students at Jin Ding. The Children’s Palace has sent volunteer 
teachers for nine consecutive years, providing free lessons on how 
to build ship and car models. East China Normal University and 
Madam Ambassadors offered teacher training programs, while 
the sports bureau also provided training programs for an array of 
sports including judo, track, weight-lifting, and canoeing. Two 
students from Jin Ding School entered Shanghai’s second-tier 
sports teams, and those who enter the first-tier can qualify for 
Shanghai hukou. By providing a wide range of extracurricular 
activities, the school helped its students attain the local hukou in 
non-traditional ways and prepared them for future professions in 
case they choose to stay in Shanghai. 
 Jin Ding was divided into three campuses. In 2019, two of 
its current campuses will move to a new and larger campus that is 
assigned by the government. The third campus, also the smallest, 
might move over to join the other two when its 10-year contract 
with its current location expires in five years. The government’s 
plan is to eventually accommodate all 3,000 students in the new 
campus, but Vice Principal Zhou expressed concern over security 
and crowdedness.
Conclusion
 A universal trajectory for migrant education emerged over 
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the past decade (2008-2018). During the three-year reform, all of 
the interviewed schools were privatized and received financial 
support from their local education bureau. Then, coinciding with 
the city-wide demolition of unauthorized constructions which 
“purged” migrant populations across Shanghai, each school 
experienced a gradual decrease in student enrollment. At the 
same time, the opening of public-school admissions also attracted 
a substantial number of migrant students from these private 
schools. With the radical decrease of students on one hand and 
dwindling funds from the local education bureau on the other, 
the remaining schools are quickly diminishing. Given that the 
migrant education policies of Shanghai are synchronized with the 
general migrant accommodation quota, as the migrant growth rate 
continues to fall, migrant schools might be completely displaced 
by the full assimilation of migrant students into Shanghai’s public 
and private education systems. 
190
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